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REMEDIES-EQUITABLE REMEDIES FOR VIOLATION OF ANTITRUST
LAWS-JOINT RESEARCH VENTURES IN POLLUTION CONTROL-In re
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 538 F.2d
231 (9th Cir. 1976).
In 1969, the four major automakers1 and their trade association, Au-
tomobile Manufacturers Association, consented to a decree of the dis-
trict court' designed to prevents their conspiring to restrain the devel-
opment and installation of antipollution devices in violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act.4 At the same time, there arose a concerted
movemen among various individuals, classes, and governmental enti-
1. American Motors Corp., Chrysler Corp., Ford Motor Co., and General Motors
Corp.
2. United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd
per curiam sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970), noted
in 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LiB. L. REv. 408 (1970). Text of the consent decree
is in 1969 Trade Cas. 72,907, at 87,456 (C.D. Cal.).
3. The consent decree was not an admission of the conduct alleged; it merely pro-
scribed future participation in the types of antitrust activities itemized in the decree.
1969 Trade Cas. 72,907, at 87,457 (C.D. Cal.).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). In pertinent part, the consent decree enjoined any con-
spiracy:
(1) To prevent, restrain or limit the development, manufacture, installation, dis-
tribution or sale of air pollution control equipment for motor vehicles;
(2) Adhering to agreements with reference to patents and patent rights.
In rc Multidistrict Private Civil Treble Damage Antitrust Litigation Involving Motor Ve-
hicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 1970 Trade Cas. f 73,318, at 89,255 (C.D. Cal.).
5. During the pendency of the government suit which culminated in the aforemen-
tioned consent decree, the individuals, cities, counties, states and other governmental
agencies were denied intervention as party plaintiffs to assert their treble damages
claims. United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 1970 Trade Cas. 73,070, at 88,203-4
(C.D. Cal.). The claimants then filed a new action for treble damages in which they
successfully opposed a motion to dismiss for lack of a "commercial relationship" between
themselves and defendants. In re Multidistrict Private Civil Treble Damage Antitrust
Litigation Involving Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 1970 Trade Cas.
73,318, at 89,255-56 (C.D. Cal.). See generally 24 VAND. L. REv. 126 (1970). The
victory was brief, however, and the war was lost when the Ninth Circuit reversed an
interlocutory order and denied all plaintiffs standing for damages under section 4 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). Standing was unavailable to those claimants,
excepting the farmers claiming injury to crops, on the basis of lack of "commercial in-
jury." Standing was denied to the farmers since they were outside the "target area" of
the alleged violation. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d
122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973), noted in Note, Use of Antitrust Law
as Environmental Remedy for Suppression of Pollution Control Technology, 15 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 813 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust, Law); Comment,- Anti-
trust-The Ninth Circuit Grants a Section 16 Clayton Act Plaintiff Standing ;to- .Se
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ties to alleviate continuing economic and environmental injury" caused
by pollutants needlessly emitted from under-equipped automobiles
manufactured during the fourteen year period of the alleged conspir-
acy.
7
Even Though as a Section 4 Plaintiff He Is Not oL the Firing Line, 5 LoY. CHI. L.J.
655 (Winter 1974). The same decision, however, did grant plaintiffs standing to
assert equitable remedies under section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26
(1970), but with an express reservation of judgment as to the merits of plaintiff's
claims and to the availability of injunctive relief for such claims. In re Multi-
district Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, supra at 131. The equitable reme-
dies of restitution and mandatory injunction requested, discussed in notes 20-25 infra and
accompanying text, were found unavailable by the district court in lt re Multidistrict
Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 367 F. Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1973), a!I'd sub
nom. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 538 F.2d 231
(9th Cir. 1976).
6. The injuries alleged by the plaintiffs to the original action decided in 1970, see
note 5 supra, In re Multidistrict Private Civil Treble Damage Antitrust Litigation In-
volving Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 1970 Trade Cas. 73,318,
at 89,255 (C.D. Cal.), varied according to class:
mhe governments claimed that they had been injured by damage to public build-
ings and greenery, increased benefits to welfare clients suffering from pollution-
related diseases, and increased expenditures to combat air pollution. The suit on
behalf of all farmers in the United States claimed crop damage resulting from air
pollution.
24 VAND. L. REV. 126, 126 n.5 (1970).
7. The cross-licensing agreement among auto manufacturers, which was the subject of
the consent decree entered in 1969, was formalized by its members in 1955. J. Esro-
srro, VANISHING Am, THE NADER REPORT 41 (1970).
Complaints against the auto manufacturers focused on the activities of the "cross-
licensing" agreement entered into between the major automobile manufacturers, the
Automobile Manufacturers Association and certain smaller companies. The agreement
provided for royalty-free exchange of patents acquired from members and third parties
and for uniform licensing terms. Lanzillotti & Blair, Automobile Pollution, Externalities
and Public Policy, 18 ANTrrRosT BULL. 431, 442 n.17 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Automobile Pollution]. In addition to the patent licensing provisions, the agreement
provided for the signers to pool their research and development information. Brief for
Appellee Chrysler Corp. at 9-10, In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution v. Automobile
Mfrs. Ass'n, 538 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1976). The consent decree resulted in the break-up
of both aspects of the venture. United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 1969 Trade
Cas. 72,907 at 87,456 (C.D. Cal.). In their briefs to In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air
Pollution appellants accused the auto corporations of generally effecting a delay in pol-
lution abatement research and installation of antipollution devices by: (1) imposing uni-
form installation and announcement dates on cooperating members; (2) jointly reducing
personnel and funds (up to 60%) for pollution control; (3) diluting California exhaust
standards; (4) opposing changes to California pollution control device ("PCD") certifi-
cation requirements which would have assisted independent manufacturers; (5) suppres-
sing emission control development information to technicians and public officials outside
the conspiracy; and (6) delaying application for certification of Chrysler's "Clean Air
Package." Brief for Appellant at 31-35, In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution v.
Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 538 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1976).
The auto manufacturers claimed that consumer reluctance and inadequate state cooper-
ation were the major contributors to the delay, if any, and that without research coopera-
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The recent Ninth Circuit ruling in In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air
Pollution v. Automobile Manufacturers Association 'held that the reme-
dies of restitution and mandatory "retrofit' of all automobiles under-
equipped as a result of the alleged antitrust conspiracy were unavail-
able under the federal antitrust laws." This decision followed an earlier
Ninth Circuit judgment granting the same twenty-two state' 2 and certain
county, city and individual appellants standing to sue for equitable re-
lief under section 16 of the Clayton Act. 13
tion in the industry, techniques of pollution control would not have been discovered at
the early date they were. Brief for Appellee Chrysler Corp. at 6 et seq., In re Multi-
district Air Pollution v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 538 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1976). The
district court characterized the cooperative effort for pollution control as "less than
spectacular." In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 367 F. Supp.
1298, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1973) aff'd sub nom. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution v.
Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 538 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1976). For a description of the content
and effect of the auto manufacturers' agreement see generally J. Esposrro, VANISHING
Ant, THE NADER REPORT 41 (1970); Andrews, Antitrust Law Meets the Environmental
Crisis-An Argument for Accommodation, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 840, 858-62 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as Environmental Crisis]; Automobile Pollution, supra, at 431, 441-45;
Willens, The Regulation of Motor Vehicle Emissions, 3 NATURAL RE OURCES LAw. 120,
126-28 (1970).
8. 538 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1976).
9. The restitution claim was for reimbursement of expenses incurred by auto owners
who had voluntarily retrofitted their automobiles and as reimbursement for costs im-
posed on persons who voluntarily compensated for the incremental pollution through
other pollution control measures. Brief for Appellants at 30, In re Multidistrict Vehicle
Air Pollution v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 538 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1976).
10. "Retrofit" is the installation of presently available pollution control devices on all
automobiles not presently so equipped and the updating of certain pollution control de-
vices to present day technological levels. 538 F.2d at 234 n.3.
11. Id. at 234. The remedies were sought pursuant to the Clayton Act, § 16,
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
12. Most of the states were suing in parens patriae, that is, on behalf of their residents
for injuries to "quasi-sovereign" interests. "Quasi-sovereign" interests are those state in-
terests, economic and non-economic, which exist apart from those of the individual citi-
zens. Comments, 18 N.Y.L.F. 465, 467 n.8 (1972). See also Malina & Blechman,
Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. U.L. REv.
193, 197 (1970); Note, State Protection of its Economy and Environment: Parens Pa-
triae Suits for Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & SOCIAl PROBLEMs 411 (1970). Only states,
and not other political subdivisions such as cities and counties, whose power is derivative
and not sovereign, can sue as parens patriae. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollu-
tion M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
States have standing to sue for equitable relief as parens patriae under section 16 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970), and until very recently, did not have standing
to sue for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258 (1972), aff'g, 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir.
1970); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 453, 460 (1945). The "Antitrust
Parens Patriae Act," Pub. L. No. 94-435 (September 30, 1976) permits state attorneys
general to recover treble damages on behalf of residents injured by antitrust violations.
13. The Clayton Act, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970), provides:
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Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides for equitable relief against
"threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws."' 4 In-
juries remediable under this section are, by the Ninth Circuit's own
measure, injuries "to any interest cognizable in equity,"'-" including in-
jury to the environment. 16 The lesson of Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollu-
tion is that proof of a "cognizable" injury, standing alone, will not secure
a remedy under section 16. It must also be shown that the form of
remedy requested fits the language and purposes of the Clayton Act.
The district court in Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution opined that
the remedies requested were more suitable to an action in nuisance than
to an action in antitrust.' The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's opinion, relying with more particularity on a literal reading of
section 16 and on the general antitrust enforcement policies underlying
the Clayton Act. Restitutionary relief, in the form of compensation
to those persons who had voluntarily retrofitted their automobiles, was
denied by the Ninth Circuit on the ground that such expenses consti-
tuted "past" losses. Relief for losses incurred in the past is not provided
for in section 16, which is limited by its terms to protection from
"threatened" (i.e., future) loss or damage.'" Past expenses are recover-
able, the court said, only under section 4 of the Clayton Act;' 9 under
this section, however, the appellants were found to have no standing to
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have
injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over parties,
against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws ... when and
under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened con-
duct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules
governing such proceedings ....
Id.
14. Id.
15. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 130 n.13
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973), citing Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
324 U.S. 439 (1945); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
16. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 130-31
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
17. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 367 F. Supp. 1298, 1305
(C.D. Cal. 1973), af'd sub nom. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution v. Automobile
Mfrs. Ass'n, 538 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1976).
18. The text of section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970), may be found
in note 13 supra.
19. 538 F.2d at 234. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States ... without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sstained ....
Id.
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sue.2" The second form of relief sought, that of compelling the auto-
makers to retrofit automobiles with up-to-date pollution control devices,
was refused on the ground that the remedy served no antitrust goal
of enjoining or threatened antitrust conduct or of redressing injuries to
the competitive system.2 1
The appellants' contention in Multdistrict Vehicle Air Pollution sig-
nified the first attempt to use antitrust law as a solution to widespread
environmental pollution '--a problem of recent attack under federal
legislation 23 and, to a much lesser extent, under nuisance law.24 Al-
though the instant case does not resolve the question of whether the acts
20. See note 5 supra.
21. 538 F.2d at 235. The following cases were cited by the court demonstrating the
use of antitrust remedies to enjoin ongoing conduct on the basis of injuries unrelated to
the competitive system: Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (injunc-
tion under section 16 enjoining railroad companies from conspiring to fix rates to the
detriment of Georgia's economy); Bratcher v. Akron Area Bd. of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723
(6th Cir. 1967) (enjoining conspiracy of Board of Realtors to prevent blacks from pur-
chasing or renting homes). Other decisions were cited for the proposition that antitrust
remedies under section 16 of the Clayton Act could be used to undo past injuries to the
competitive system where there was no showing of ongoing conduct: United States v.
Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 60-64 (1973) (approving nondiscriminatory sales and
licensing of patents to break up pooling agreements); Ford Motor Co. v. United States,
405 U.S. 562, 573-75 (1972) (approving divestiture of a company to restore pre-acquisi-
tion market structure); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 93-
94 (1950) (approving that violators of the Sherman Act may be required to license
patents at prescribed rates and sell products according to prescribed terms). The retrofit
remedy sought by appellants did not fall into either of these groups of cases, but was,
instead, a request for a decree broadly designed to eliminate air pollution and not really
to further the purposes of the antitrust laws. 538 F.2d at 234-35. See text accompany-
ing notes 92-96 infra.
22. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 367 F. Supp. 1298, 1306
(C.D. Cal. 1973), affd sub nom. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution v. Automobile
Mfrs. Ass'n, 538 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1976). See Antitrust Law, supra note 5, at 816. See
generally Environmental Crisis, supra note 7, at 840; Currie, Cooperative Research and
the Anti-Trust Laws, 36 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 690 (1954); Marquis, Compatability of In-
dustrial Joint Research Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 38 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1964); Turner,
Patents, Antitrust and Innovation, 28 U. Prrr. L. REV. 151 (1966); Note, Joint Research
Ventures under the Antitrust Laws, 39 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 1112 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Joint Research].
23. Zener, Antitrust and Pollution Control: An EPA Perspective, 36 U. Prrr. L. REv.
705 (1975). See generally Address by Robert Baum to the ABA Symposium on Law
of the Environment, Washington, D.C., Nov. 1-2, 1973, Air Quality Control in the
1970's Federal Viewpoint, 7 NATURAL RESOuRCES LAw. 189 (1974); Miller, Federal Air
Pollution Control Legislation: A Selective Description, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW. 105
(1970); Russell, Common Law Environmental Liability Under Federal Statutes, 11
FoRtum 778 (1976); Stevens, Air Pollution and the Federal System: Responses to Felt
Necessities, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 661 (1971).
24. See generally Rice, Pollution as a Nuisance: Problems, Prospects and Proposals,
34 A.T.L.LJ. 202 (1972); Comment, Equity and the Eco-System: Can Injunctions Clear
the Air?, 68 MicH. L. REV. 1254 (1970); Note, Air Pollution, Nuisance Law and Private
Litigation, 1971 UTAH L. REv. 142.
242 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
of the automakers were illegal under the antitrust laws, Multidistrict
Vehicle Air Pollution raises the possibility than an antitrust remedy for
environmental injury can exist under properly stated circumstances .2
The purpose of this note is to discuss the problem of proving that joint
research and development agreements are violative of antitrust law and
then, assuming the existence of such a violation, to examine the Ninth
Circuit's analysis of the availability of equitable relief under section 16
of the Clayton Act and the restraints that analysis places on environ-
mental, as well as other potential, antitrust litigants.
I. THE ANTITRUST VIOLATION
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution is the first case to directly raise
the issue of the legality of joint research and development agreements
among competitors in the same industry.2 6 In the absence of any
standard for testing such agreements under the antitrust laws,2' the
Ninth Circuit decided the instant case on the grounds of failure to state
a remedy under the Clayton Act. 25 The court thus declined to pass
on the district court's finding that the automakers had not violated the
antitrust laws. 9
One cannot readily criticize the circuit court's avoidance of the issue,
for the policy considerations inherent in an antitrust analysis of joint
research and development ventures are especially acute in the context of
pollution control. All citizens want clean air and water, but few are
willing to pay its high costs. The automakers have little incentive to
pioneer antipollution research since such devices do not generally
enhance the value or performance of the auto. Increased retail prices
to cover costs of research and development inevitably reduce new car
sales. Jointly administered research and development programs have
the ameliorative effect of spreading the risk and cost of pollution control
among the several participants. This maximizes the benefits of
research by reducing the duplication of effort.30
25. See text accompanying notes 71-73 & 86 infra.
26. Environmental Crisis, supra note 7, at 849; Antitrust Law, supra note 5, at 816.
For a general antitrust analysis of joint research and development programs see
Currie, Cooperative Research and the Anti-Trust Law, 36 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 690 (1954);
Verleger & Crowley, Air Pollution, Water Pollution, Industrial Cooperation and the
Antitrust Laws, 4 LAND & WATR L. REV. 475 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Air Pollution];
Joint Research, supra note 22, at 1112.
27. See note 41 infra.
28. Clayton Act, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970). See note 13 supra.
29. See note 45 infra and accompanying text.
30. Joint Research, supra note 22, at 1113.
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Nevertheless, the joint research agreement may be abused to the
effect that it excludes independent research by nonmembers. 3 This,
in turn, might lead to the exclusion of third party invention from
the marketplace.3 2 In times of public concern about environmental
safety, a monopolization of research information might be used to cre-
ate false appearances as to the true state of the art.
33
In determining the legality of such ventures in the field of pollution
control, there is the additional problem of weighing the amount of so-
cial responsibility which can be fairly attributed to profit oriented pri-
vate industry. In the absence of specific state-imposed standards, it
is unlikely that consumers would unilaterally undertake pollution con-
trol measures which add to their cost of living.34 It is perhaps reason-
able that no higher a sense of morality be imposed on private industry.
However, where state standards exist, anticompetitive conduct in re-
search and development might properly be dealt with through antitrust
controls.
The antitrust laws provide a mechanism whereby these considera-
tions can be integrated into a judicial determination of whether or not
a joint research and development agreement violates section 1 of the
Sherman Act.35  The so-called "rule of reason 36 standard for antitrust
violations relies on the proposition that a restraint of trade is not illegal
unless "unreasonable. '3 7 The "rule of reason" is essentially a balanc-
ing of several factors38 to arrive at a decision which is most fair in view
31. Air Pollution, supra note 26, at 481.
32. Note, Antitrust Law-Joint Research Efforts in Pollution Control Validated, 20
WAYNE L. REv. 1321, 1323 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Pollution Control].
33. See note 7 supra describing specific allegations in this regard.
34. Automobile Pollution, supra note 7, at 436.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
36. The "rule of reason" was first enunciated in United States v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
37. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911). Other conduct, not analyzed by the "rule of reason," is a per se violation of
the Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), including: Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (refusal to deal); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (market-division); United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price stabilization); United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (price fixing); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (resale price maintenance).
38. In Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), the following
factors were relevant to an application of the "rule of reason:"
IT]he facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint, and its effect,
1976]
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of the purposes of the alleged anticompetitive activity.
The agreement among the automakers in the instant case was poten.
tially illegal in two respects: (1) the cross-licensing of patents, and
(2) the suppression of competition in the research and development
of pollution control technology.3" Cross-licensing agreements among
competitors can be illegal "when used to effect a monopoly, or to
fix prices, or to impose an otherwise unreasonable restraint upon in-
terstate commerce."4  Agreements which suppress competition in re-
search and development of technological ideas remain untested under
the antitrust laws.41 Since applying the rule of reason in the context
of pollution control would involve difficult questions of public policy,42
a case-by-case analysis would be necessary. An analogous set of cir-
cumstances arose in the case of United States v. National Malleable &
Steel Castings Co. 43  In that case, the defendants were accused of vio-
lating federal antitrust law by engaging in a patent licensing scheme
designed to standardize interchangeable railroad couplers. In uphold-
ing the legality of the scheme, the court said:
,[The defendants] joined together and fought a little war to save arms,
legs, lives, and freight and time . . . . If they didn't have this team-
work for the benefit of our people, they might still be fighting over
patent differences,* and we might never have perfected a standard
interchangeable coupler.
44
The district court holding in Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution
stated that a conspiracy among competitors in product research and de-
velopment does not violate the federal antitrust laws where the partici-
pating companies consistently competed in the sale of the product in
question.45 This view ignores the impact of research and development
actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, [and] the purpose or end ....
Id. at 238.
39. See generally Pollution Control, supra note 32, at 1322-25.
40. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 175 (1930). See generally Anti-
trust Law, supra note 5, at 817, and cases cited therein.
41. Joint Research, supra note 22, at 1123. See generally Pollution Control, supra
note 32, at 1321.
42. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
43. 1957 Trade Cas. f 68,890, at 73,589 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd per curiam, 358 U.S.
38 (1958).
44. Id. at 73,589.
45. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 367 F. Supp. 1298, 1305
(C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd sub norn. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution v. Auto-
mobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 538 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1976). The district court additionally
stated:
Mhe nuisance is not the result of any conspiracy or combination in restraint of
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on pricing, sales, and marketing. In technologically competitive indus-
tries "survival is largely dependent upon aggressive R & D programs."46
At most, the competitive marketing of ideas, as opposed to products,
is no broader a concept of "trade," as that term is used in the Sherman
Act,47 than is the concept of "services," which has repeatedly been
held to be subject to the federal antitrust laws.
48
It is fortunate, therefore, that the Ninth Circuit did not rely on the
district court's reasoning in its affirmance of the judgment denying the
forms of equitable relief requested. 4  But the Ninth Circuit also does
not state whether or not the conduct of the automakers constituted an
antitrust violation and thus leaves an important area of antitrust law yet
unexplored. Assuming that anticompetitive activity in pollution con-
trol research and development can violate the federal antitrust laws,
does the court's remedial analysis of section 16 close all the doors by
which the environmental plaintiff might obtain equitable relief? This
is the topic of the discussion which follows.
I. THREATENED Loss
Since the creation of a right to equitable relief under the Clayton
Act,50 private parties have not enjoyed the full panoply of common law
equitable remedies for federal antitrust violations. By its literal terms,
section 16 of the Clayton Act5 limits the scope of available private
remedies by imposing three proof requirements including: (1) a threat
of loss or damage; (2) resulting from a present or future act by defend-
trade. It is, if anything, the consequence of the free marketing of a smog producing
product.
Id.
46. Joint Research, supra note 22, at 1115-16. Moreover, anticompetitive activity in
research and development prevents independent inventors from competing and may
make products essentially identical and, consequently, less competitively marketed. Id.
at 1119-20.
47. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), prohibits "[e]very contract,
combination . . .or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... .
48. Joint Research, supra note 22, at 1117-18 nn.23-25.
49. The Ninth Circuit opinion confined itself to the issue of availability of remedies,
holding that the remedies sought under section 16 of the Clayton Act are not available
under the unique facts of these cases. 538 F.2d at 234.
50. Private parties had no right to injunctive relief against violations of the Sherman
Act prior to passage of the Clayton Act in 1914. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
254 U.S. 443, 465 (1920). But see Flynn, A Survey of Injunctive Relief Under State
and Federal Antitrust Laws, 1967 UTAH L. REv. 344, 361 n.143 [hereinafter cited as
A Survey of Injunctive Relief].
51. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
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ant; (3) which violates the antitrust laws. 2  Even assuming that an
antitrust violation or threat thereof can be proved, the additional re-
quirement of showing a significant threat of injury from the violation
poses difficult and costly obstacles for the private litigant."3
The phrase "threatened loss or damage" includes three concepts.
"Loss or damage" has been interpreted to encompass any injury "cog-
nizable in equity" including loss or damage to environmental inter-
ests. 54 A section 16 injury is a much broader concept than that of sec-
tion 4 of the Act, which limits recovery of damages for harm to "business
and property." 55  Section 16's "loss or damage" requirement must be
alleged in terms of a special and particularized injury as opposed to
a general public harm.56 This is not to say, however, that the public
interest is irrelevant to an analysis of private remedies.5 7 Rather, it sug-
gests that private and governmental suits arising out of violations of the
antitrust laws fulfill distinct policy goals-a distinction which might ac-
count for the remarkable difference between the scope of injunctive
52. The text of section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970), may be found
at note 13 supra.
53. A Survey of Injunctive Relief, supra note 50, at 363. See also Bray v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 1975-1 Trade Cas. 60,194, at 65,671 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
54. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
55. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1971), aff'g 431 F.2d 1282 (9th
Cir. 1970). The text of section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), may be
found at note 19 supra. A definition of "business and property" is stated in Roseland v.
Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1942).
56. See United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1953); Simpson v. Union
Oil Co., 311 F.2d 764, 767 (9th Cir. 1963); Union Pac. R.R. v. Frank, 226 F. 906,
909 (8th Cir. 1915).
57. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969):
Section 16 should be construed and applied with this purpose in mind, and with the
knowledge that the remedy it affords, like other equitable remedies, is flexible and
capable of nice "adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and pri-
vate needs as well as between competing private claims."
395 U.S. at 131, quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944). Private
parties serve as "an ancillary force of private investigators to supplement the Department
of Justice in law enforcement." Note, Availability of Divestiture in Private Litigation
as a Remedy for Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 49 MINN. L. Rnv. 267, 272
n.35 (1964). In Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532 F.2d 674 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3340 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1976), rev'g 348 F. Supp. 606
(C.D. Cal. 1972), the Ninth Circuit rejected an analysis by the district court propos-
ing that the requirement of a personal threat of injury be discarded in private divesti-
ture suits. The district court had reasoned that a section 7 divestiture plaintiff serves
public policy goals as something of a "class representative" and is therefore entitled
to a relaxation of the personal threat requirement. However, contrary to the apparent
philosophy of the Ninth Circuit, it is suggested that the primary purpose of all private
antitrust remedies should be the fulfillment of "private needs" created by the illegal
conduct and not public policy enforcement. See note 58 infra.
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relief available to private and governmental entities under the Clayton
Act. 8
It appears, from the language of section 16, that the "threatened loss
or damage" must be of the sort that is continuing or apt to recur in
the future. 9 The plaintiff must prove that there exists at the time of
the suit a threat of injury which is something more than an abstract
or nebulous plan to violate the law.60 Plaintiffs are aided in their heavy
burden61 by a presumption of continuing conduct drawn from defend-
ant's past antitrust violations.62 However, neither past violations nor
actual injury is necessary to make a sufficient showing for relief.6 3
The appellants' request for restitution64 in Multidistrict Vehicle Air
Pollution was denied because it envisioned reimbursement for sums ex-
pended in the past and because there was no showing that the expenses
were continuing or apt to recur in the future.6 5 In its analysis of pri-
58. Private party enforcement provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts are sec-
tions 4 and 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1970). Governmental enforcement by injunction is
provided for in section 15 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1970). Cf. United States
v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518-19 (1954), citing United States v. Bendix Home Appli-
ances, 10 F.R.D. 73, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) for the proposition that:
[lhe scheme of the statute [Clayton Act §§ 4, 15, 16] is sharply to distinguish be-
tween Government suits, either criminal or civil, and private suits for injunctive re-
lief or for treble damages. Different policy considerations govern each of these.
Id. (emphasis added). Affirmative equitable remedies such as dissolution and divestiture
have been repeatedly granted in governmental suits, while they have generally been
denied to private parties suing under section 16. For reference to case authorities, see
notes 77-80 infra and accompanying text.
59. The general rule is that injunctive relief under section 16 issues only upon a show-
ing of continuing or threatened injury. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
395 U.S. 100, 132 (1969); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec-
tronics Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 920-25 (9th Cir. 1975); Credit Bureau Reports, Inc.
v. Retail Credit Co., 476 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1973); General Fireproofing
Co. v. Wyman, 444 F.2d 391, 393 (2d Cir. 1971). The denial of relief in each of these
cases can, however, be justified on the absence of a showing of continuing or threatened
antitrust conduct. What then is the result where there is no evidence of continuing or
threatened conduct but there is a showing of continuing injury to the environment? The
Ninth Circuit in Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution held that under such facts
a remedy will issue under section 16 only if it appears that a granting of the remedy
would serve some enforcement goal of the antitrust laws. 538 F.2d at 235.
60. General Fireproofing Co. v. Wyman, 444 F.2d 391, 393 (2d Cir. 1971). See also
United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 520 (1954); Corn Prods. Ref. v. FTC,
324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945).
61. See note 53 supra.
62. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952).
63. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130 (1969),
and cases cited therein.
64. See note 9 supra for a description of the restitutionary remedy sought by appel-
lants.
65. 538 F.2d at 236. This reasoning by the court does not take into consideration
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vate affirmative relief under section 16, the Ninth Circuit, in the instant
case, appears to support the view that the scope of remedies available
under section 16 is as broad as necessary to serve the enforcement
purposes of the antitrust laws.66 Depriving the antitrust violator of the
gains of illegal conduct, the court stated, is a proper basis upon which
to formulate equitable antitrust remedies.6 7  Also, in Schine Chain
Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 8 the Supreme Court stated that resti-
tutionary relief is one method of depriving a defendant of the gains
of his antitrust conduct. It has not been an uncommon occurrence
in equity suits involving protection of the public interest for courts to
permit compensatory or restitutionary recovery where the federal statute
did not specifically provide for it.69 Therefore, it is somewhat discon-
certing that the circuit court would rely on a technical reading of the
statute, unnecessary to its judgment,70 as a basis for dismissing the resti-
tution request.
The result in Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution need not, however,
mean death to all future private party claims for restitution under the
Clayton Act. An equity court has the power, once jurisdiction is ob-
tained, to decide all matters in dispute and to award complete relief,
even though the decree includes that which might be conferred by a
court of law.71  A successful claim for injunctive relief under section
the fact that although the expenses were incurred in the past, they were incurred for
the purpose of preventing future and continuing environmental injury. The statute is
expressly applicable to the prevention of continuing or threatened injury.
66.1ld. See text accompanying notes 98-9 infra.
67. 538 F.2d-at 236.
68. 334 U.S. 110, 128-29 (1948).
69. See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (restitution to
the federal government for performing a duty imposed by the Rivers and Harbors Act of
-1899); Mitchell v. De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960) (ordering payments of
wages to employees discharged in violation of Fair Labor Standards Act); United States
v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616 (1951) (restitution of rent overcharges in violation of Housing
and Rent Act of 1947); Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946) (restitution
of rent overcharge in violation of Emergency Price Control Act); Walling v. O'Grady,
146 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944) (ordering payments of wages to employees discharged in
violation of Fair Labor Standards Act). These cases were unsuccessfully argued by ap-
pellants in Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution. Brief for Appellants at 27 et seq. , In re
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 538 F.2d 231 (9th Cir.
1976).
70. The Ninth Circuit stated, as additional grounds for dismissal, that appellants' re-
quest was not truly one for restitution because there was no allegation that the automak-
ers had received any money from the car owners to which they were not entitled. 538
F.2d at 234. The court might also have denied restitution on the grounds of the im-
practicability of administering the reimbursement program. See Boise Cascade Int'l, Inc,
v. North Minn. Pulpwood Producers Ass'n, 294 F. Supp. 1015 (D. Minn. 1968).
.7-.. Alexander v; Hillman, 296 U.S.-222, 241-42 (1935).
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16 of the Clayton Act, though not achieved by the appellants in the
instant case, should provide a basis for restitution in spite of the
statute's limiting language. Furthermore, since restitution can be
obtained through an action at law as well as in equity,72 section 4 of the
Clayton Act73 would be an alternative course by which to assert a right
to restitution.
III. CONTINUING CONDUCT AND ANTITRUST GOALS
Section 16 of the Clayton Act permits private litigants to "have in-
junctive relief. . when and under the same conditions and principles
as injunctive relief against threatened conduct. . . is granted by courts
of equity . . .. 74 Ostensibly, the section's reference to "threatened
conduct" would limit the choice of remedies to preventive relief only.
The appellants in Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution sought affirma-
tive relief in the form of a retrofit remedy to prevent further pollutant
emissions from autos under-equipped with pollution control devices as
a result of the alleged antitrust conspiracy. The Ninth Circuit, presum-
ably in the belief that it is best to withhold decision on issues unneces-
sary to reaching a judgment, noted but declined to decide whether sec-
tion 16 excludes all forms of affirmative equitable relief for private
parties.75
Governmental antitrust enforcement statutes, like section 16, are
couched in language which appear to limit them to the grant of pre-
ventive remedies only.76 However, the use of affirmative relief in gov-
ernmental antitrust suits is a well-established practice. 77  The issue of an
72. Moore v. United States, 182 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1950), rev'd on other grounds,
340 U.S. 616 (1951).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
75. 538 F.2d at 235 n.6. For a discussion of the grounds relied on to deny the manda-
tory retrofit remedy, see text accompanying notes 94-96 infra.
76. The United States Attorney General is authorized under the Sherman Act § 4, 15
U.S.C. § 4 (1964) and the Clayton Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964), "to institute pro-
ceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations."
77. Including: (1) divestiture (United States v. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S.
316 (1961)); United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); (2) divestiture
and severance of interlocking directorate (International Boxing Club, Inc. v. United
States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959)); (3) divorcement (United States v. Paramount Pictures.
Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948)); (4) mandatory injunction to offer an option to lessees of
patented products (Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444 (1952)); (5) manda-
tory injunction to lease, distribute or sell patented products at nondiscriminatory or rea-
sonable rates (United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973)); United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76 (1950); International Salt Co. v. United
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implied right to affirmative relief under section 16 has arisen in the con-
text of private actions for dissolution or divestiture of corporate entities
operated or merged in violation of the antitrust laws.7 1 A diversity of
views has resulted, with the Ninth Circuit handing down a comprehensive
analysis of the issue in International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v.
General Telephone & Electronics Corp.79 The holding in that case
deprives private parties of a right to the remedy of divestiture.80
In Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution the Ninth Circuit indicated that
its holding in International Telephone might be limited to suits for di-
vestiture or dissolution.8' The court's caution may have been prompted
by -recent criticism leveled at the International Telephone decision. In
NBO Industries Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,82 the Third
Circuit chastised the Ninth Circuit's reliance on legislative history over
sixty years old to guide their "contemporary application of a statute
laying down a fundamental national economic policy. '8 3  The Interna-
tional Telephone decision should be narrowly construed in view of the
especially drastic nature of divestiture and dissolution remedies.8 4  As
has been already suggested, private and governmental antitrust suits
under the Clayton Act serve differing purposes.8 The distinct role of
the Department of Justice in protecting the public interest from the
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947);
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945)).
78. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970), and section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). See generally Note, Availability of Divestiture
in Private Litigation as a Remedy for Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 49
MnqN. L. Rav. 267 (1964). For a list of decisions favoring and refusing private divesti-
ture actions see NBO Indus. Treadway Co., Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 1975-2 Trade Cas.
60,479, at 67,128 n.17 (3rd Cir.).
79. 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975).
80. Id. at 920-25. The Supreme Court has let stand the Ninth Circuit view that
divestiture is not available to private litigants. Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 45 U.S.L.W. 3340 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1976), denying cert. to 532 F.2d 674
(9th Cir. 1976).
81. 538 F.2d at 235 n.6.
82. 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,479, at 67,128-29 (3rd Cir.).
83. Id. at 67,128-29.
84. In the Supreme Court opinion of Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 593 (1951), Justice Reed's concurrence reflects his concern with the severity
and potential abuse of the divestiture remedy:
Since divestiture is a remedy to restore competition and not to punish those who
restrain trade, it is not to be used indiscriminately, without regard to the type of
violation or whether other effective methods, less harsh, are available. That judicial
restraint should follow such lines is exemplified by our recent rulings in United
States v. National Lead Co., where we approved divestiture of some properties
belonging to the conspirators and denied it as to others,.
Id. at 603 (citation omitted).
85. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
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effects of antitrust violations would permit its use of extreme remedies
which might not be otherwise warranted in a private action. Conversely,
where the affirmative remedy requested by a private party is well
trimmed to the needs of the particular injury alleged, section 16 should
be flexibly read to permit the issuance of appropriate affirmative
injunctions.&
Affirmative injunctions to control voting rights of shareholders8 7 and
to divest rights of public performance for profit" have been granted
upon a showing of continuing or threatened conduct against which a
preventive injunction has issued in the same action. No court has yet
given affirmative relief under section 16 where it is the sole remedy
sought, although dicta in several cases have indicated that such relief
would be available to private parties.8 9 In Multidistrict Vehicle Air
Pollution the court emphasized that a remedy under the antitrust laws
may be obtained if the remedy would have the additional effect of end-
ing an ongoing violation. 90  It is arguable that this reasoning permits
the tacking of an affirmative injunction onto a request for preventive
relief enjoining continuing or threatened antitrust conduct.
Quoting from Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States,91 the Ninth
Circuit announced a new standard for fashioning private equitable reme-
dies under section 16. The form of relief sought must further one or
more of the enforcement goals of the antitrust laws, including: (1) ter-
minating ongoing antitrust conduct; (2) depriving violators of the bene-
fits of their illegal conduct; or (3) restoring competition to the market-
place.92 The antitrust laws are not, the court stated, a broad license
to promote the general welfare through eliminating air pollution93 but
are designed to accomplish specific goals related to the competitive sys-
86. One writer has suggested that affirmative injunctive relief should always be avail-
able to protect the private plaintiff from future loss or damage from violation of the
antitrust laws. A Survey of Injunctive Relief, supra note 50, at 366.
87. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
88. Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y.
1948).
89. See note 78 supra.
90. 538 F.2d at 236.
91. 334 U.S. 110 (1948).
92. 538 F.2d at 234-35. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110
(1948), involved a governmental antitrust suit. The antitrust goals recited therein do
not, therefore, include goals of compensation or reparation of private injuries. Accord-
ing to the Ninth Circuit in the instant case, these latter goals are covered by section 4 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). There is not, however, any authority for such
a policy distinction between sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act.
93. Id.
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tern. The retrofit remedy could not be justified under this standard
because no ongoing antitrust conduct was alleged,9' the benefits reaped
from the conspiracy were indefinite and therefore incapable of being
translated into a public compensation program, 9 and restoration of
injuries to the environment has no reparative effect on the competi-
tive system. 9  The private injured party must state facts which
would tie the remedy sought into the accomplishment of one or more
of these goals. If this cannot be done, the party must attempt to find
redress under the more restrictive provisions of section 4 of the Act
9 7
or, as in the instant case, stand remediless.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis is in accord with other decisions limiting
federal equity jurisdiction to accord with the policy of the legislature.
In Mitchell v. De Mario Jewelry, Inc.,98 the Supreme Court ordered
the payment of wages to employees discharged in violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, despite the fact that the remedy was
unprecedented under the statute, on the basis that the result was
consistent with the "historic power of equity to provide complete relief
in light of the statutory purposes."9
In addition to the enforcement purposes recited by the Ninth Circuit,
there is the additional purpose of curing the illegal effects of antitrust
conduct. 100 Restitutionary or affirmative remedies have the effect of
curing the private injuries which result from an antitrust violation. As-
suming that section 16 is not limited to preventive remedies only,' the
rule of Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution would permit reparative re-
lief exclusively in cases where the harm suffered is related to the restora-
tion of competition. Whether or not such an injury is broader or nar-
rower than the "business or property" requirement of section 4 of the
Clayton Act is not explained by the instant decision. However, because
the Ninth Circuit conceded that private suits for damages under section
94. Id.
95. The court in Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution noted that the small financial
benefits, if any, reaped by the automakers were incapable of being translated into a value
equivalent for purposes of retrofit. 538 F.2d at 236 n.7. There are, however, tangible
benefits which accrue to the auto industry through successful suppression of pollution
control research. They are discussed in Automobile Pollution, supra note 7, at 439-41.
96. 538 F.2d at 236.
97. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
98. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
99. Id. at 292 (1960) (emphasis added), citing Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 195, 203 (1839) for the similar proposition that "there is inherent in the Courts
of Equity a jurisdiction to. . .give effect to the policy of the legislature."
100. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 88 (1950).
101. See notes 85-87 supra and accompanying text.
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4 of the Clayton Act serve the antitrust goal of curing the effects of the
illegal conduct, it is logical that a showing of injury to "business or
property" should satisfy the new "restoration of competition" standard
of section 16. This reasoning would not have saved appellants' claim
in the instant case because noneconomic (environmental) injuries were
alleged. Environmental litigants would do well to frame their equitable
antitrust remedies in terms of the economic impact of pollution.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit rulings leading up to and including its holding
in Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution denote both an expansion and
contraction of the parameters of section 16. Injured parties are
restricted in their choice of remedies by the requirement that the remedy
serve to further specific enforcement goals. To the extent that nonpre-
ventive remedies can be obtained in the future, the injury must at least
be one which is tantamount to the "business and property" interests of
section 4. On the other hand, persons injured by reason of an antitrust
violation have standing to obtain preventive relief on the basis of threat-
ened noneconomic injury. Arguably, such injured parties may demand
other relief which, in addition to furnishing a preventive remedy, would
adequately compensate victims of the antitrust activities. The result
is a substantial grant of power for environmentalists prospectively to
bring pressure to bear on industries which illegally suppress competi-
tion in the research and production of pollution control measures.
Stephen J. Densmore
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